戴高乐那明显荒唐的举动就成了法国政治复兴的象征

 

戴高乐与美国的争论始于圣皮埃尔岛和密克隆岛，这是纽芬兰海岸外的两个小岛：1763年《巴黎条约》放过的法国北美帝国的残余部分。

珍珠港遇袭后，罗斯福联系了负责法国西半球属地的维希官员，要求将这两个岛屿正式中立化--这将使它们的无线电台无法向过往的德国潜艇广播。

尽管维希同意了这一请求，但戴高乐认为，任何外国，即使是仁慈的，未经他的同意而干涉法国的内部事务，都是不可接受的。

因此，他命令他的小海军指挥官埃米尔-穆塞利埃（Émile Muselier）上将以自由法国的名义占领这些岛屿。

 

De Gaulle’s controversies with America began over St Pierre and Miquelon, two tiny islands off the coast of Newfoundland: vestigial remnants of France’s North American empire that had been spared by the Treaty of Paris of 1763. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt had contacted the Vichy official responsible for France’s Western Hemisphere possessions, requesting the islands’ formal neutralization – which would preclude their radio station from broadcasting to passing German submarines. Though Vichy granted that request, de Gaulle found it unacceptable that any foreign country, even if benevolent, should interfere in French internal matters without his agreement. He therefore ordered the commander of his tiny navy, Admiral Émile Muselier, to occupy the islands in the name of the Free French.

 

使这一举措更加粗暴的是，登陆行动发生在12月23日，正值丘吉尔抵达华盛顿与罗斯福进行他们作为盟友的第一次战时会晤。

戴高乐在圣诞节前夕给穆塞里耶写信，指示他不要被美国的抗议所迷惑。

 

What made this initiative all the more brash was that the landing took place on December 23, just as Churchill was arriving in Washington to confer with Roosevelt for their first wartime meeting as allies. Writing to Muselier on Christmas Eve, de Gaulle instructed him not to be deflected by US protestations:

　  　

我们把一块铺路石扔进了一个青蛙池塘。

安静地呆在圣皮埃尔，组织政府和电台。

任何外国政府的代表如果就岛屿问题向你讲话，你都应该要求他向[自由法国] 全国委员会讲话[42]。

 

We threw a paving stone into a frog pond. Stay quietly in Saint-Pierre, organize the government and the radio station. Any representative of any foreign government who addresses you regarding the islands should be requested by you to address the [Free French] National Committee.[42]

　  　

穆塞里耶的部队在没有抵抗的情况下占领了这些岛屿，并在12月26日组织了一次公民投票，以确认他们对自由法国人的忠诚。

 

Muselier’s forces seized the islands without resistance and, on December 26, organized a plebiscite to confirm their allegiance to the Free French.

 

在西半球发生突然袭击的任何可能性，即使是像这样微不足道的袭击，也必然会使华盛顿感到不安，特别是在珍珠港事件发生两周后。

国务卿科戴尔-赫尔非常愤怒，他在一份抗议公报中提到了 "所谓的自由法国人"，这个词在媒体和国会中受到广泛批评。[43]

戴高乐进行了报复，从那时起，他称赫尔为 "所谓的国务卿"。

到1942年2月，赫尔的副手萨姆纳-韦尔斯恢复了自由法国人和华盛顿之间的合作。

 

Any possibility of a surprise attack in the Western Hemisphere, even a minuscule one such as this, was bound to upset Washington, especially two weeks after Pearl Harbor. Secretary of State Cordell Hull was so outraged that in a protest communiqué he referred to the ‘so-called Free French’, a phrase widely criticized in the media and Congress.[43]

 

De Gaulle retaliated by, from then on, calling Hull the ‘so-called Secretary of State’. By February 1942, Sumner Welles, Hull’s deputy, had restored cooperation between the Free French and Washington.[44]

 

这样一来，戴高乐那明显荒唐的举动就成了法国政治复兴的象征。

事实上，他在面对巨大的权力差距时捍卫法国的历史身份的冲动是一贯的，而且在很多方面是英雄式的，这成为恢复法国伟大的前提条件。

他很清楚这对他的盟友来说是多么的令人气愤。

他们也许认为我不是一个容易合作的人，"他喃喃自语。

'但如果我是，我今天就会在贝当的总参谋部了。

 

In this way, de Gaulle’s apparently absurd stroke became a symbol of France’s political recovery. Indeed, his impulse, consistent and in many ways heroic, to defend France’s historical identity in the face of great disparities of power became the prerequisite to restoring French greatness. He was well aware of how exasperating this was for his allies: ‘They think perhaps that I am not someone easy to work with,’ he mused. ‘But if I were, I would today be in Pétain’s General Staff.’[45]

 

戴高乐的挑战行为植根于他试图重塑的宏伟概念。

正如我们所看到的，它源于法国在欧洲大陆上追求卓越的行为--这种卓越总是即将实现，却总是被英国的力量平衡政策所阻挠--它注入了戴高乐对他作为自由法国人领袖的责任的解释。

它不可避免地包括努力阻止英国在战争过程中先发制人地解决历史争端的任何诱惑。

 

De Gaulle’s challenging behavior was rooted in the concept of grandeur he sought to reenact. Derived, as we have seen, from French conduct in quest of preeminence on the Continent – a preeminence always on the verge of being achieved, ever thwarted by Britain’s balance-of-power policies – it infused de Gaulle’s interpretation of his responsibility as leader of the Free French. Inevitably it included an effort to forestall any temptations on the part of the British to settle historic disputes preemptively during the course of the war.

 

丘吉尔偶尔会被激怒，他曾调侃道："是的，戴高乐确实认为自己是圣女贞德，但我该死的主教不会让我烧死他。

然而，最终，戴高乐和丘吉尔在整个战争期间保持着一种矛盾的合作。

丘吉尔使戴高乐的努力在财政上成为可能，并保护他不受罗斯福的敌意影响--例如在1943年5月，总统半真半假地建议将戴高乐流放到马达加斯加。

 

Occasionally exasperated, Churchill once quipped: ‘Yes, de Gaulle does think he is Joan of Arc, but my bloody bishops won’t let me burn him.’ Yet in the end, de Gaulle and Churchill managed an ambivalent kind of cooperation throughout the war. Churchill made de Gaulle’s efforts financially possible and protected him from Roosevelt’s hostility – as in May 1943, when the president half-seriously suggested exiling de Gaulle to Madagascar.[*]