美国对中国的利益提出了质疑,伤害了中国的尊严

 六四之后,中国的保证足以让香港人和外国政府满意。

美国已经明确表示,英国在公共外交方面只能靠自己,但乔治-布什总统告诉撒切尔夫人,他同情对香港的担忧。

作为一个对中国有经验的人和前中央情报局局长,布什不容易被震惊。

但在六四之后,中国的行为甚至让坚定的接触者质疑其在危机中的作用。

当布什试图给邓小平打电话时,中国外交部说,他们不清楚邓小平在哪里,无法联系美国总统。

布什随后派遣他的国家安全顾问布伦特-斯考克罗夫特执行秘密任务,与邓小平会面。

中国军队的空中交通管制员没有被他们的上级告知他的C-141 "星际 "飞机要来,并询问他们是否应该击落它。

这个请求一直传到了杨尚昆主席那里,他批准了飞机的降落。

72日上午,安全抵达的斯考克罗夫特会见了邓小平,邓小平认为布什的友好声明不够充分,没有多说什么就把他交给了李鹏和强硬派进行进一步的无益的会谈。

 

Assurances from China were enough to satisfy neither the people of Hong Kong nor foreign governments after June Fourth. The United States had made it clear that Britain was on its own in public diplomacy, but President George Bush told Mrs Thatcher that he sympathised with the fears for Hong Kong. As a veteran of China and a former head of the CIA, Bush was not easily shocked. But after June Fourth, China’s behaviour made even staunch advocates of engagement question its usefulness in a crisis. When Bush tried to put a phone call through to Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese foreign ministry said they were not clear where he was and could not connect the American president. Bush then dispatched his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, on a covert mission to meet Deng. Chinese military air traffic controllers were not told by their superiors that his C-141 Starlifter jet was coming and asked if they ought to shoot it down. The request went all the way to President Yang Shangkun, who cleared the plane for landing. On the morning of 2 July a safely delivered Scowcroft met Deng, who dismissed Bush’s avowals of friendship as insufficient and without much more ado handed him over to Li Peng and the hardliners for further, profitless talks.

 

邓小平与斯考克罗夫特会面的解密文本暴露了与中国谈判时最顽固和防守的现实,这正是柯利達爵士和威尔逊在紧张时刻发现的。

美国国会以418票对0票表决通过的全面制裁措施激怒了中国领导层,而美国媒体的报道则加剧了邓小平自己对推翻其政府的阴谋的怀疑,这并没有什么帮助。

坦率地说,这甚至可能导致战争,"邓小平说。

'美国对中国的利益提出了质疑,伤害了中国的尊严。

这就是问题的关键所在。

 

The declassified text of Deng’s encounter with Scowcroft laid bare the reality of negotiating with China at its most intransigent and defensive, exactly as Cradock and Wilson had found it at moments of stress. It did not help that a vote in the US Congress by 418 to 0 for comprehensive sanctions had infuriated the Chinese leadership, while the US media coverage intensified Deng’s own suspicions of a plot to overthrow his government. ‘To be frank, this could even lead to war,’ Deng said. ‘The United States has impugned Chinese interests, has hurt Chinese dignity. That is the crux of the matter.’

 

美国驻中国大使,中央情报局老兵詹姆斯-利利警告说,双方必须找到一种退步的方式。

里尔利并不抱有幻想。

早在20世纪70年代,亨利-基辛格的助手之一理查德-所罗门曾向他透露,基辛格在内心深处认为,"美国现在必须与中国人打交道,因为如果他们变得强大,他们将无法对付。

这也是尼克松的观点,2009年去世的利利也逐渐认同这一观点。

 

The US ambassador to China, CIA veteran James Lilley, warned that the two sides had to find a way to step back. Lilley did not deal in illusions. Back in the 1970s, one of Henry Kissinger’s aides, Richard Solomon, had confided to him that Kissinger, deep down, believed that ‘America had to deal with the Chinese now, because if they ever got strong, they would be impossible to deal with.’ This was also the Nixon view, and Lilley, who died in 2009, grew to share it.

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